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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of ANTHONY SMITH, 89-A-6874, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 01-1 1-ST2363 Index No. 638-1 1 
Appearances: Anthony Smith 
Inmate No. 89-A-6874 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Fishkill Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 307 
Beacon, NY 12508 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Brian J. u'Uonnell, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Fishkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceedin? to review a determination of respondent dated November 10, 
2009 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of fifteen 
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(1 5 )  years to life upon conviction (after plea) of kidnaping in the first degree. Among the 
arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the Parole Board’s decision 
does not give the petitioner guidance in adjusting his future behavior in order to gain parole, 
the court failed to consider the liberty interest in the expectation of early release, the denial 
of parole was improperly based on the same criteria as the sentencing hearing, thus 
subjecting the petitioner to Double Jeopardy and violating collateral estoppel, the Board 
relied on erroneous facts in making its determination, the Board’s decision was pre- 
determined, the board did not give appropriate weight to petitioner’s status as a re-appearing 
parole candidate or his institutional record, and the twenty-four (24) month hold placed on 
petitioner was excessive. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“After a review of the record and interview, the Panel has 
determined that if released at this time your release would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate 
the serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the 
law. This decision is based on the following factors: Your 
instant offense is kidnaping 1’‘ Degree, for which you are 
serving 15 to life. The crime involved you and others abducting 
a victim in a shoppiIig wntci’ pihing lut dt guriyuinr, dmariding 
ransom money and repeatedly raping her. The Board notes your 
letters of support, letter of employment and positive program 
evaluation. More compelling, however, is the brutal and vicious 
nature of the instant offense and your callous disregard for the 
physical and emotional well-being for the victim. As such, your 
release at this time is inappropriate.” 
As stated in Executive Law 52594 (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
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remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matw ul‘C‘ul1i.A L h c u  1 ’ v A  brttic L3ir.ihiun of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
200 11). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional pragramming and his plans upon release. The decision 
was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and 
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it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 
[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). 
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner andor 
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he 
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit 
(see Executive Law 5 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR 5 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661 
[2nd Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 2 1 AD3d 11 74 [3'd 
Dept., 20051). 
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the 
inmate's crimes and their violent nature (E Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board 
of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 
1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 
[3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see 
Matter of Young; v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 168 1 [3rd Dept., June 24,20101; 
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor 
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (g Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, "[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight tu, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
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petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the’ other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter nfpiirio v New Yor-k-S_tteJivision of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re- 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
DeDartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has 
served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty 
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 114, 1 1 15 [3rd Dept., 
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of 
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Mrrtter of 
Codv v Denniscn, 33 AD2d 1141, 1 142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; 
Matter of Burress v D e n ~ c g ,  37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20073). 
With regard to the Parole Board’s failure to consider the minutes of petitioner’s 
sentencing (as required under Executive Law 259-i [2] [c] [A] Imt sentencc, which mako 
reference to the provisions of Executive Law 8 259-i [ 11 [a]), it is now well settled that this 
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does not mandate a new hearing where, as here, the minutes are not available for review, 
after a diligent search has been made to obtain them (see Matter of Freeman v Alexander, 65 
AD3d 1429, [3rd Dept., 20091; Matter of Blasich v New York State Divisinn of Parole, 68 
AD3d 1339, 1340-134 1 [3rd Dept., 20091; see a!:o Matter of Lebron v Alexander, 68 AD3d 
1476, 1477 [3'd Dept., 20091 [Held: where the Parole Board is unable to consider the 
sentencing minutes a favorable presumption does not arise]; Matter of Andren v Aleumdey, 
72 AD3d 1 178 [3'd Dept., 20 lo]). In this instance, the respondent has submitted the affidavit 
of Jerri Krevoff, Chief Court Reporter of Nassau County Court, who avers that the Court 
Reporter who took the sentencing minutes is no longer in the employ of the court system, and 
that despite a diligent search, her notes cannot be found. Under the circumstances, the failure 
to consider petitioner's sentencing minutes does not serve as grounds to annul the parole 
determination. Apart from the foregoing, a review of the plea taken on April 3,1989 reveals 
that County Court Judge Abbey L. Boklan indicated that as part of the plea agreement he 
would take no position with respect to petitioner's release when the petitioner came before 
the Parole Board. 
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess ofthe parole 
guideline range (see, 9 NYCRR 800 I .3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and 
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each 
individual case'' (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division 
of Parole, 290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans, 82 AD3d 
1397 [3d Dept., 20 1 1 I). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn 
the Board's decision. 
With regard to the petitioner's claim that the Parole Board relied on erroneous 
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information that he was convicted of raping the victim of the instant offense, the Court finds 
this argument to be without merit. The transcript of the parole interview clearly reveals that 
the Parole Board was aware that kidnaping first degree is the only offense to which petitioner 
pleaded guilty. The questioning during the parole interview regarding the rape of his victim 
is a result of the Board’s proper consideration of information contained in petitioner’s 
presentence investigation report (E Matter of Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 1 1 
AD3d 766,767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041; Matter of Carter v Evans, 8 1 AD3d 103 1 [3rd Dept., 
201 11). Additionally, the petitioner admitted the rape during the parole interview, saying, 
“I’m deeply regretful to [the victim’s] father [I and her family for my callous behavior toward 
her. I am a father and a grandfather now. I have a 21-year-old daughter and two 
granddaughters. If someone was to kidnap and rape them, as I did to [the victim], I would 
feel deep pain, disgust, anger, helplessness and sorrow, knowing that there was nothing I can 
do to help them.” Petitioner also said, “I objectified (sic) and I had no respect for women. 
I viewed women as sex objects. In looking back now, I raped [the victim] long before I 
crossed her path that day because of my thoughts and my views.” In considering the 
presentence investigation report and the petitioner’s own statements at the hearing, the Parole 
Board did not base their determination upon erroneous facts and/or a misapprehension of the 
facts. 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
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The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: June 39,2010 
Troy, New York 
F 




Order To Show Cause dated February 3,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated April 8,20 1 1, Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
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